Are mathematical theories reducible to non-analytic foundations?

DOI10.1007/s10516-012-9182-3zbMath1302.00054OpenAlexW2041589499MaRDI QIDQ482327

Stathis Livadas

Publication date: 23 December 2014

Published in: Axiomathes (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-012-9182-3

zbMATH Keywords

axiom of choiceinfiniteGödel's incompleteness theoremsintentionalityfinitisticfirst-level idealizationindividual-substratesecond-level idealizationSkolem-Löwenheim theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Axiom of choice and related propositions (03E25) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

Cites Work

• Brouwer meets Husserl. On the phenomenology of choice sequences
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• Brouwer and Weyl: The Phenomenology and Mathematics of the Intuitive Continuumt†
• Elements of a Phenomenological Justification of Logical Principles, including an Appendix with Mathematical Doubts concerning some Proofs of Cantor on the Transfiniteness of the Set of Real Numbers†
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