Collusion and Price Rigidity
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Publication:4823477
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00286zbMath1096.91006OpenAlexW2148460419WikidataQ57568074 ScholiaQ57568074MaRDI QIDQ4823477
Chris William Sanchirico, Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63406
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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