Arms Races and Negotiations

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00287zbMath1096.91001OpenAlexW1971435586MaRDI QIDQ4823478

Tomas Sjöström, Sandeep Baliga

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00287

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (14)

Negotiation statements with promise and threat ⋮ Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ A dynamic theory of war and peace ⋮ Repeated coordination with private learning ⋮ Receiver's dilemma ⋮ Investment dynamics with common and private values ⋮ Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games ⋮ Stag hunt with unknown outside options ⋮ The strategic role of nonbinding communication ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ X-games

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