Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

DOI10.4064/am31-1-7zbMath1099.91001OpenAlexW1982490890MaRDI QIDQ4829406

Andrzej Wieczorek

Publication date: 29 November 2004

Published in: Applicationes Mathematicae (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4064/am31-1-7

zbMATH Keywords

invisible handevolutionary modelscomplementaritycompetitive equilibriumvoting gamedemand functionanonymous gamemarket mechanismKakutani Theorem(Cournot-)Nash equilibrium\(n\)-matrix gameproduction-consumption models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Fixed-point and coincidence theorems (topological aspects) (54H25) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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