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Strategy-Proof Exchange - MaRDI portal

Strategy-Proof Exchange

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Publication:4833988

DOI10.2307/2951697zbMath0834.90007OpenAlexW2052712170MaRDI QIDQ4833988

Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1 April 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951697




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