Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts

DOI10.1287/MNSC.40.10.1228zbMath0822.90040OpenAlexW2020264361MaRDI QIDQ4834328

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Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.10.1228

zbMATH Keywords

long-term contractsdelayed communicationprincipal agent problemcommunication in agencieseconomic value of participative processeslong-term incentivesmultiperiod agency problemparticipative budgeting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information

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