Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4834437
DOI10.2307/2118358zbMath0826.90035OpenAlexW2164370208MaRDI QIDQ4834437
No author found.
Publication date: 30 May 1995
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4480.pdf
Related Items (25)
Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles ⋮ Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations ⋮ Social norms, cooperation and inequality ⋮ Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach ⋮ Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment ⋮ Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium ⋮ Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts ⋮ Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent ⋮ Returns to skills, incentives to study and optimal educational standards ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Efficient purchaser incentive when dealing with suppliers implementing continuous improvement plans ⋮ The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study ⋮ Partnerships based on joint ownership ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency ⋮ Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism ⋮ Endogenous and exogenous commitment ⋮ Attorney fees in repeated relationships ⋮ Productive low morale ⋮ Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence
This page was built for publication: Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
