Generalized Condorcet winners

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0765-8zbMath1302.91086OpenAlexW2158633442MaRDI QIDQ483530

Sarah Wolff, Michael E. Orrison, Jennifer Townsend, Aaron Meyers, Angela Y. Wu

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0765-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?

Cites Work

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• Symmetry extensions of ``neutrality. II: Partial ordering of dictionaries
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Symmetry extensions of neutrality. I: Advantage to the Condorcet loser
• On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
• On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Condorcet’s Paradox

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