Complexities of electing diverse committees
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Publication:483536
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0773-8zbMath1302.91088OpenAlexW2051311875MaRDI QIDQ483536
Thomas C. Ratliff, Donald G. Saari
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0773-8
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