(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0769-4zbMath1302.91096OpenAlexW1963544355MaRDI QIDQ483551

Martin Kolmar, Dana Sisak

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0769-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents

Cites Work

• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• Contest success functions
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Incentives in Teams

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