Stable and efficient coalitional networks

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0132-8zbMath1302.91037OpenAlexW2146859253MaRDI QIDQ483573

Ana Mauleon, Jean-François Caulier, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0132-8

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencynetworkscoalition structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items

Coalition-proof stable networks ⋮ Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation

Cites Work

• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• Informal insurance in social networks
• Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
• Public goods in networks
• Communication networks with endogenous link strength
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Stable networks
• Networks of collaboration in oligopoly.
• Contractually stable networks
• Strongly stable networks
• Allocation rules for network games
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Unnamed Item

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