Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains

DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7zbMath1302.91085OpenAlexW2013824052MaRDI QIDQ483577

Bernardo Moreno, Ricardo Martínez

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesspreference aggregationtops-onlynessvoting by committees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the Measurement of Polarization
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution