Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
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Publication:483585
DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0154-xzbMath1302.91188OpenAlexW3124015626MaRDI QIDQ483585
Jianpei Li, Thomas Giebe, Ludwig Ensthaler
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0154-x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)
Cites Work
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- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
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- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
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