The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9383-2zbMath1304.91074OpenAlexW1998230308MaRDI QIDQ483636

Clark Bowman, Jonathan K. Hodge, Ada Yu

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9383-2

zbMATH Keywords

game theorylearningseparabilitycomputer simulationiterative votingreferendum elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

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