The Recursive Core

DOI10.2307/2951631zbMath0835.90014OpenAlexW2021993836MaRDI QIDQ4836508

Subir K. Chakrabarti, Robert A. Becker

Publication date: 15 April 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951631

zbMATH Keywords

core allocationstime consistencyrecursive coreinfinite horizon capital accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (8)

Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Core concepts for incomplete market economies ⋮ CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES ⋮ The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games ⋮ The weak sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective

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