Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
From MaRDI portal
Publication:483921
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9384-1zbMath1304.91075OpenAlexW2032996150MaRDI QIDQ483921
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9384-1
independence of irrelevant alternativesArrow's impossibility theorembinary independencecollective choice rule
Related Items (5)
Some axiomatic limitations for consensus and supertree functions on hierarchies ⋮ On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making ⋮ Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Twitching weak dictators
- The independence condition in the theory of social choice
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives before Arrow
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of coice
- Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
- Information and preference aggregation
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
- Internal Consistency of Choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
This page was built for publication: Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
