Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control

DOI10.2307/2297801zbMath0829.90048OpenAlexW2032421578MaRDI QIDQ4840270

Jeffrey Zwiebel

Publication date: 24 July 1995

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297801

zbMATH Keywords

shareholder structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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