Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

DOI10.2307/2171907zbMath0837.90128OpenAlexW2077936171MaRDI QIDQ4845248

Lutz-Alexander Busch, Quan Wen

Publication date: 22 October 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsresrpt/506

zbMATH Keywords

delayrepeated gamesnegotiationalternating-offers bargainingdisagreement gamemultiple perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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