A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0814-YzbMath1307.91052OpenAlexW2107381611MaRDI QIDQ485426

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Gabriele Esposito, Naoki Watanabe, Eric Guerci, Xiaoyan Lu

Publication date: 9 January 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/32059/files/SCW_43-4.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining ⋮ An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value ⋮ Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
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