Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
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Publication:485435
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0zbMath1307.91069OpenAlexW2165525781MaRDI QIDQ485435
Publication date: 9 January 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0
Related Items (3)
Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
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- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
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