On the optimal composition of committees

DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0805-zzbMath1307.91068OpenAlexW3123272991MaRDI QIDQ485437

Leif Danziger, Ruth Ben-Yashar

Publication date: 9 January 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4685.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees ⋮ Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor

Cites Work

• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
• Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
• Judgment aggregation without full rationality
• Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. I: General agendas
• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
• Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
• Deliberative voting
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Symmetric and asymmetric committees
• The Condorcet jur(ies) theorem
• Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result

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