Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.013zbMath1302.91063OpenAlexW2068169170MaRDI QIDQ485574

Dominic Rohner, Roland Hodler, Simon Loertscher

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

costly signalingpersuasioninformation distortionexpert advice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Influential news and policy-making ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes

Cites Work

• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Experimental design to persuade
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*

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