On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.018zbMath1302.91113OpenAlexW2108412390MaRDI QIDQ485580

Christian Seel, Cédric Wasser

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/45f949ee-6f11-4214-ba5d-e462eef3ac96

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctioncontesthead start

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Head starts in dynamic tournaments? ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Designing Dynamic Contests ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

This page was built for publication: On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions