Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.034zbMath1302.91055OpenAlexW1973922576MaRDI QIDQ485607

Peter McGee, John H. Kagel

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.034

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationpersonalityfinitely repeated prisoner dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Theory of mind predicts cooperative behavior ⋮ Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

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