Information provision before a contract is offered

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.037zbMath1302.91129OpenAlexW2110918070MaRDI QIDQ485733

Dongsoo Shin, Jaesoo Kim

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.037

zbMATH Keywords

agency contractinginformation provisioninformation rent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Sequential Screening
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

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