Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.006zbMath1302.91131OpenAlexW3125612039MaRDI QIDQ485745

Luís Vasconcelos

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/12309/1/Contract_Signal_Investment_Final.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationexclusivityrelationship-specific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory ⋮ Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

This page was built for publication: Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements