A foundation for strategic agenda voting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.006zbMath1302.91071OpenAlexW2033504908MaRDI QIDQ485757

Jose Apesteguia, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Miguel Ángel Ballester

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19910

zbMATH Keywords

institutionscommitteesaxiomsstrategic votingagendas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

Revealed votes ⋮ Two‐stage majoritarian choice ⋮ A theory of iterative choice in lists ⋮ Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections ⋮ Social Choice Theory

Cites Work

• Choice by sequential procedures
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
• Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
• On the Justice of Decision Rules
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

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