A foundation for strategic agenda voting
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Publication:485757
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.006zbMath1302.91071OpenAlexW2033504908MaRDI QIDQ485757
Jose Apesteguia, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Miguel Ángel Ballester
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19910
Related Items (5)
Revealed votes ⋮ Two‐stage majoritarian choice ⋮ A theory of iterative choice in lists ⋮ Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections ⋮ Social Choice Theory
Cites Work
- Choice by sequential procedures
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- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
- On the Justice of Decision Rules
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
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