Learning with bounded memory in games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.005zbMath1302.91032OpenAlexW1994151153MaRDI QIDQ485768

Daniel Monte

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbounded memoryincomplete information games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Bounded memory in a changing world: biases in behaviour and belief ⋮ Bad reputation with simple rating systems ⋮ Trait-Augmented Games with Limited-Skill Agents

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The strength of a little perfection
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• The absent-minded driver
• Randomization and simplification in dynamic decision-making.
• A Theory of Credibility
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Learning with Finite Memory

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