On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009zbMath1302.91153OpenAlexW1976842437MaRDI QIDQ485776

Keisuke Bando

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithmstrictly strong Nash equilibriumstudent-optimal deferred acceptance algorithmstudent-optimal von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

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Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings, When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?, Epsilon-stability in school choice, A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea, Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets), Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm, School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms, Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice, Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications

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