Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
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Publication:485786
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.016zbMath1302.91103OpenAlexW2043548377MaRDI QIDQ485786
Topi Miettinen, Tore Ellingsen
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.016
Related Items (4)
Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
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