Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.016zbMath1302.91103OpenAlexW2043548377MaRDI QIDQ485786

Topi Miettinen, Tore Ellingsen

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.016

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcommitmentwar of attritiondisagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types

Cites Work

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