An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.001zbMath1302.91054OpenAlexW2126212971MaRDI QIDQ485790

David Hugh-Jones, Morimitsu Kurino, Christoph Vanberg

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/14140/1/hugh-jones_et_al_2014.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesprobabilistic serial mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Efficient lottery design ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• School choice: an experimental study
• Kidney Exchange
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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