The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.015zbMath1302.91158OpenAlexW2035817426MaRDI QIDQ485793

Lucas Maestri

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelsubjective evaluations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Folk theorem with communication
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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