Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.005zbMath1302.91035OpenAlexW2135819739MaRDI QIDQ485795

Shintaro Miura

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

fully revealing equilibriummulti-sendersmultidimensional cheap talksequential communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions ⋮ Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games ⋮ Sequential cheap talks

Cites Work

• Eliciting information from a committee
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• A Model of Expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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