Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.001zbMath1302.91058OpenAlexW3123011090MaRDI QIDQ485801

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23381

zbMATH Keywords

transparencydisclosureendogenous informationsignal qualityspecific investmentstrategic ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

Cites Work

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• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Arm's Length Relationships

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