Assigning agents to a line
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Publication:485809
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.011zbMath1302.91160OpenAlexW1999442185MaRDI QIDQ485809
Lars Peter Østerdal, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Jens Leth Hougaard
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.011
Related Items (5)
A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem ⋮ Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line ⋮ A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Assigning agents to a line
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