Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.004zbMath1302.91104OpenAlexW2037006877MaRDI QIDQ485822

Daniel F. Garrett

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

minimaxcost-based procurementsimple mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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