Wright on the Non-mechanizability of Intuitionist Reasoning

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/3.1.103zbMATH Open0842.03006OpenAlexW2138742918MaRDI QIDQ4859239

Michael Detlefsen

Publication date: 22 July 1996

Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.103

zbMATH Keywords

Gödel's incompleteness theoremsphilosophy of mindmechanisation of thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

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