A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
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Publication:4865749
DOI10.2307/2298112zbMath0841.90022OpenAlexW1590632185MaRDI QIDQ4865749
Publication date: 24 July 1996
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64174
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)
Related Items (16)
Cracking down on bribery ⋮ Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition ⋮ A Reputation Game Simulation: Emergent Social Phenomena from Information Theory ⋮ Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity ⋮ Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations ⋮ Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance ⋮ The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers ⋮ Corruption and power in democracies ⋮ COLLECTIVE REPUTATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION ⋮ The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development ⋮ Long-term relationships as safeguards ⋮ Social norms and trust among strangers ⋮ Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent ⋮ Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers ⋮ On the cultural transmission of corruption
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