A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems

DOI10.2307/2298113zbMath0845.90019OpenAlexW2044446338MaRDI QIDQ4865750

Matthew O. Jackson, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 28 February 1996

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298113

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumimpossibility resultsdominant strategiesdictatorial social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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