Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks

DOI10.1007/S11538-014-0031-YzbMath1329.91018OpenAlexW2061914338WikidataQ47806845 ScholiaQ47806845MaRDI QIDQ486646

Shaolin Tan, Yao Chen, Pei Wang, Sha-Sha Feng

Publication date: 16 January 2015

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-014-0031-y

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationstructured populationfixation probabilitytwo-strategy game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Locality based wealth rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games

Cites Work

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• Spatial invasion of cooperation
• Towards A Theoretical Framework for Analysis and Intervention of Random Drift on General Networks
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Bounds on variances of recovery times of decision feedback equalizers
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• An analysis of the fixation probability of a mutant on special classes of non-directed graphs

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