Why frequentists and Bayesians need each other

DOI10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8zbMath1303.62015OpenAlexW2085285086MaRDI QIDQ486953

Jon Williamson

Publication date: 19 January 2015

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Related Items (5)

Equivocation for the objective Bayesian ⋮ Confidence distributions and empirical Bayes posterior distributions unified as distributions of evidential support ⋮ Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics ⋮ How uncertain do we need to be? ⋮ From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic

Cites Work

• Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
• Interval estimation for a binomial proportion. (With comments and a rejoinder).
• Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory
• Probabilistic logics and probabilistic networks
• In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
• Uncertain Inference
• A formal theory of inductive inference. Part I
• The problem of inductive inference
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