On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2013.09.003zbMath1303.92079OpenAlexW2067312754WikidataQ46877684 ScholiaQ46877684MaRDI QIDQ487335
Laurent Lehmann, Slimane Dridi
Publication date: 20 January 2015
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_E6628D11E4D8.P001/REF.pdf
stochastic approximationreinforcement learningevolutionary game theoryfictitious playfluctuating environmentsproducer-scrounger game
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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