An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
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Publication:4876700
DOI10.1006/jagm.1996.0020zbMath0852.68034arXivmath/9503235OpenAlexW2065843143MaRDI QIDQ4876700
Publication date: 11 December 1996
Published in: Journal of Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9503235
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