Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring

DOI10.2307/2298077zbMath0847.90019OpenAlexW2146524607MaRDI QIDQ4883969

Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Publication date: 13 October 1996

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298077

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contracting modelmyopic firm behaviourprofitable long-term projectsrenegotiation-proof contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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