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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 - MaRDI portal

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4885983

zbMath0854.90147MaRDI QIDQ4885983

Guillermo Owen, Michael Maschler

Publication date: 19 January 1997


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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