Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts

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Publication:4887198

DOI10.2307/2297888zbMath0855.90015OpenAlexW2048756123MaRDI QIDQ4887198

Jeffrey Zwiebel, Lars Stole

Publication date: 1 August 1996

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297888




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