Disposing the leftovers under the consignment contract with revenue sharing: retailer vs supplier

DOI10.1007/S11424-011-9063-7zbMath1308.90007OpenAlexW2071095775MaRDI QIDQ488888

Jianbin Li, Wei Hu

Publication date: 27 January 2015

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-011-9063-7

zbMATH Keywords

revenue sharingsupply chain managementStackelberg gameconsignment sales

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Related Items (4)

Optimal rebate strategies in a two-echelon supply chain with nonlinear and linear multiplicative demands ⋮ Coordinating pricing and advertising decisions for supply chain under consignment contract in the dynamic setting ⋮ Introducing an external terminal operator or not? The decision of ports in a duopoly market ⋮ Fairness of extra-gain guilty in performance of supply chain and contract design

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation
• Note. The Role of Returns Policies in Pricing and Inventory Decisions for Catalogue Goods
• Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
• Joint Pricing-Production Decisions in Supply Chains of Complementary Products with Uncertain Demand
• Channel Performance Under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing
• Pricing and the Newsvendor Problem: A Review with Extensions

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