Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
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Publication:4894851
DOI10.2307/2297852zbMath0857.90013OpenAlexW3023117367MaRDI QIDQ4894851
Elhanan Helpman, Gene Grossman
Publication date: 13 November 1996
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4877.pdf
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