Polarization and Inefficient Policies

DOI10.2307/2297855zbMath0856.90030OpenAlexW2117528868MaRDI QIDQ4894854

Christian Schultz

Publication date: 13 November 1996

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297855

zbMATH Keywords

public goodpartiessequential equilibriapolicy of the winning party

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Polarization, information collection and electoral control ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games ⋮ Hiding information in electoral competition. ⋮ Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab

This page was built for publication: Polarization and Inefficient Policies