Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

DOI10.2307/2171850zbMath0856.90137OpenAlexW2007567574MaRDI QIDQ4895052

Alejandro M. Manelli

Publication date: 23 February 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171850

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talksequential equilibriainfinite signaling gamesinfinite action-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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